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 In recent years, economists have returned to
the role of institutions in economic
development. By exploring problems of risk,
imperfect information and missing markets,
development microeconomics have made
great progress in explaining the underlying
rationale and consequences of different
economic institutions often observed in poor
agrarian economies.
1 Recent theoretical
literature has, however, left little room for
influences arising from cultural values and
norms. In this respect development micro-
economics differ sharply from sociological
and anthropological analysis which emphasize
the overwhelming importance of cultural
constraints, leaving little room for individual
freedom of choice. While I think that valuable
insight can be lost by not recognizing the fact
that individual behavior is socially embedded,
I also agree with Bardhan and Udry when
noting that: “Development economics is full of
examples of how apparently irrational behaviour
may be successfully explained as an outcome of
more complex exercises in rationality,
particularly with deeper probes into the nature
of the feasibility constraints or the preference
pattern.” (Bardhan and Udry, 1999 p. 5). The
main argument of this paper is therefore that
by not denying that people are rational, a fuller
understanding of agrarian organization in the
Third World requires that the social and
cultural contexts in which people operate
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be illustrated by using the land-lease market
in Bangladesh as an example. By introducing
the concept of social status my aim is to show
that it is possible to reach a deeper under-
standing of some observed features related to
the market for land in Bangladesh. 
The majority of the 100 million people
who live in rural Bangladesh depend on
agricultural activities for their income and
employment. There is, however, an extreme
scarcity of both land and opportunities for
employment, and it is for these two sources of
income that people compete. It is estimated
that about 48 percent of rural households in
Bangladesh are landless, or have so little land
that they are dependent on leasing in land or
working as wage laborers in order to maintain
their material standard of living. Land leasing
is an important feature of agriculture in
Bangladesh. About 23 percent of the total
cultivated land is farmed under various
tenurial arrangements (Januzzi and Peach,
1980). The most common tenancy arrange-
ment is sharecropping, which accounts for
nearly 90 percent of the total leased land. 
The competition for land to sharecrop in
Bangladesh is fierce. Empirical evidence
reveals that it is almost impossible for a
landless farmer to obtain land on a
sharecropping basis. According to the Bangla-
desh Land Occupation Survey (1984) less
than 2 per cent of the total leased land is
cultivated by landless tenants. Tenants are
drawn mainly from the group of farmers
possessing some land on their own. This
observation has been explained by landlords’
reluctance to lease out their land to tenants
with little to contribute other than their labor.
Land-owning tenants have a comparative
advantage over landless tenants in the
acquisition of farm assets such as draught
animals, irrigation equipment etc., and they
generally have better access to credit. In
addition, landless tenants may lack the
necessary skills required to cultivate the rented
land properly (e.g. choice of crops, proper
land and water management, selection and
timely application of inputs, etc.). 
I do not question the importance of these
factors. My aim is rather to show that
increased productivity due to land ownership
is not the only reason why landlords prefer
land-owning tenants. Land ownership
contributes to what Bowles et.al. (2001) have
termed incentive enhancing preferences. Land
ownership, coupled with a concern for status,
gives rise to individual traits that reduce
problems of work incentives, making landed
tenants more attractive to landlords. 
The next section presents some empirical
evidence concerning social organization in
rural Bangladesh. A simple model of the
sharecropping relationship is then formu-
lated, showing that when effort is unobserv-
able variations in preferences, created by
concern for status, affect tenants’ choice of
effort, the income of the landlord, and hence
the landlord’s selection of tenants. 
Some evidence from rural Bangladesh
Bangladesh is an agrarian society where the
vast majority of the people are dependent on
agriculture for survival. In such a society, the
distribution of rights in land is not only crucial
for how production, exchange and con-
sumption take place. The distribution of
rights in land is also important in determining
the structure of status in society.2
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2.  The concept of status has always been an important part of sociological thinking. Status involves a ranking of
people according to specific characteristics and it is the economic and social rewards following from status which
03 NOPEC 30 (2) Reiersen  11-01-05  14:40  Side 122Rural Bangladesh is dominated by small
family farms operated predominantly by
family labor. There are very few big farms in
Bangladesh (Jannuzi and Peach, 1980). The
narrow range of landholding size is often cited
as evidence of the classless nature of
Bangladesh rural society. However, as Wood
(1994) notes: “Absolute smallness in farm size
should not obscure the importance of small
differences in landownership, and associated
economic activities associated with them as these
reflects clear variations in class, status, lifestyle
and power.” (Wood, 1994 p. 46 quoting
Bertocci, 1972). 
A number of field studies carried out in
rural Bangladesh have documented that
ownership of land is a variable people attach
great importance to when ranking themselves
and other in their own local stratification
system (Jannuzi and Peach, 1980; Hartman
and Boyce, 1983, Rahman, 1986; Wood,
1994). Wealthy landowners can expect to be
treated with respect and honor from fellow
villagers and in many cases they serve the role
as local leaders in social, political and
economic affairs. Because of these social and
economic rewards, wealthy landowners
continuously seek to maintain and increase
their social status through appropriate choice
of actions and investments in land (Jansen,
1986).3 At the other end of the social ladder,
smallholders enjoy superior status compared
to wage laborers. There is strong social stigma
attached to being a wage laborer in rural
Bangladesh. Working as a wage laborer in the
casual labor market means being socially
derogated to the bottom rung. Hence,
smallholders usually do not regard wage
employment as an acceptable alternative, at
least in the short run. Since working as a wage
laborer means loss of status as owner-
cultivator, a smallholder will supply his labor
at the casual labor market only under very
stressful circumstances. 
At the same time, the great majority of
smallholders in Bangladesh have too little land
to secure a subsistence income. Two acres is
regarded as the minimum amount of land
needed by an average rural family to maintain
a subsistence level of income, while those with
more than four acres can be defined as surplus
farmers. Over 80 per cent of the farms are less
than four acres in size in Bangladesh. This
means that the bulk of smallholders have too
little land relative to their endowment of labor
power. They therefore face the problem of an
excess of labor power that cannot be gainfully
employed on their own land. A solution to
this problem may be to lease in land for
sharecropping. Land leasing is attractive for at
least two reasons. Firstly, cultivation of leased
land provides a solution to the problem of
employing excess labor power. Secondly, land
leasing is a socially acceptable solution,
because by being a sharecropper you keep your
social status as an owner-cultivator. Ahmed
Status and incentives 123
gives it its force as an incentive mechanism, in turn shaping human action and social outcome. More recently
several economists have also been preoccupied with analyzing how the quest for status shape economic action.
Fershtman and Weiss (1998) give a review of some of the sociological and economic literature, while more recent
work includes Cole et.al. (1998), Brekke and Howarth (1999), Corneo and Jeanne (1999), Fang (2001), and
Fershtman, Hvide and Weiss (2001; 2003).
3. Even though landownership constitutes an important variable in the determination of a family’s status, owner-
ship of land is far from the only indicator of status in rural Bangladesh. The relationship between landholding
and social status is complex. Family background (e.g. a position in the revenue collection system of the pre-
independence government administration) or a particular occupation of present members of the family (e.g.
position as a religious leader) are other examples of factors that give rise to social status. See Jansen (1984) and
Wood (1994) for a further discussion of these matters.
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that such status effect indeed exists. Based on
a survey of two selected villages in Bangladesh,
where all households that participated in the
lease market were included (a total of 277
households), they note that: “Households that
are well endowed with family labor relative to
their holdings (...) may be reluctant to employ
the excess family labor in the agricultural wage
labor market because of the social stigma
attached to such employment. (...) Excess family
labor can be gainfully employed, however, if the
household succeeds in leasing land. (...)
Cultivation of leased land is usually not regarded
as socially demeaning.” (p. 618). More indirect
evidence, indicating that smallholders do not
regard wage employment as an acceptable
solution, come from several studies that find
that the average tenant hardly gets more, and
sometimes even less, return on his labor than
he would get alternatively by selling his labor
on the market at the prevailing wage rate
(Hartman and Boyce, 1983; Jansen, 1986;
and Rahman 1986). Still, “(…) sharecroppers
hang on to the system (…) as they derive some
psychological satisfaction from being krishaks
(farmers).” (Rahman, 1986 p. 163).
4 In sum,
the studies referred to above illustrate that the
socio-psychological pressure to remain in
cultivation rather than become a wage laborer
is strong in rural Bangladesh. 
However, as Ahmed and Taslim (1992)
point out, having access to a sharecropping
contract does not necessarily represent a long-
term solution for a tenant: “In order to ensure
that the tenants do not cultivate the land too
thinly (…) negligent tenants are penalized by
termination of their lease contracts. To make
such termination possible, landlords usually rent
land on short-term lease only.” (p. 619).
5 The
threat of eviction can thus be seen as an
endogenous enforcement mechanism that
secures the landlord’s objectives in the
relationship. However, this enforcement
mechanism may work very differently for a
land-owning and a landless tenant. For a land-
owning tenant, eviction does not simply
deprive him of the opportunity to earn an
income from the sharecropped land. He may
also be forced to enter the casual labor market
in order to meet his minimum subsistence
need. Because of the social stigma attached to
such work, this represents an additional social
cost for the landed tenant. In contrast, a
landless farmer who has already worked as a
wage laborer will generally have no objections
about taking up wage employment as an
alternative to sharecropping. He has no social
status to defend. A landed tenant is therefore
likely to work harder in order to avoid being
evicted, all else being equal. Hence, a landlord
will prefer a landed rather than a landless
tenant. 
In the next section the argument will be
clarified with the aid of a simple model. 
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4. This observation is also supported by Scott (1976) who notes that: “The conventional hierarchy of status among
the rural poor is usually smallholder, tenant, wage laborer. These are not, of course, mutually exclusive categories, since
it is common to find cultivators who simultaneously own some land and farm additional land as tenants (...). Yet,
(...) these categories have had a social reality in preferences and in status in the countryside despite the fact that the
categories could and did overlap considerably in terms of income. Marginal smallholders, for instance, were often
poorer than tenants who could rent large plots; marginal tenants, in turn, were often poorer in a good labor market
than wage workers.” (p. 35).
5. Jansen (1986) reports that sharecropping contracts generally are of a short duration in Bangladesh, usually one
year. He also notes that: “Through interviews (…) we received the clear impression that sharecropping contracts lasted
much longer a few decades ago (…). The consequences of the shortening of sharecropping contracts are that more plots
for sharecropping are on the ‘market’ (…). There is little doubt that a tenant who feels he is competing hard on an
open market to obtain a plot for sharecropping, will increase his effort to produce a good crop.” (p. 174).
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cropping
Consider a non-cultivating landlord leasing
out a given plot of land on a sharecropping
basis. At harvest time, the crop (X) is divided
between the tenant and the landlord, with the
tenant receiving y = αX and the landlord
receiving π = (1 – α)X, where 0 < α < 1. The
size of the crop depends on the tenant’s work
intensity and the care he invests in the tasks
involved in the cultivation process
(summarized in the variable L), i.e. X = f (L)
with f ′(L) > 0 and f ′′(L) < 0. 
The lease is closed for a period of at least
one crop season and is repeated infinitely so
long as the landlord is satisfied with the
tenant’s performance. If the tenant’s
performance is not satisfactory to the
landlord, the contract is not renewed and the
tenant is evicted. The probability (p) that the
tenant’s performance is not found satisfactory
by the landlord depends on the amount of
labor input supplied by the tenant on the
sharecropped land, i.e. p = p(L) with p ′(L) < 0
and p ′′(L) > 0. Hence, p(L) is the probability
of eviction, which is decreasing with the
amount of labor supplied by the tenant. 
The decision structure is as follows. First
the landlord chooses the share (α) to maximize
his own income, then the tenant chooses how
much labor (L) to supply on the sharecropped
land.
6
At the level of effort expected by the land-
lord, work is subjectively costly for the tenant
to provide. We assume that the utility of the
tenant depends positively on income and
negatively on labor input in the following way
U(y, L) = αf (L) – cL (1)
where c is the tenant’s disutility of labor
(assumed for simplicity to be constant). 
When choosing how much labor to supply
on the sharecropped land, the tenant must
consider both short- and long-term costs and
benefits. Working less hard today means more
time is available to dedicate other activities,
but a higher probability of eviction (and hence
less income) later. The value of having a
sharecropping contract can thus be defined as
the present value of the tenant’s future income,
taking into account the probability of eviction.
If r is the tenant’s rate of time preference, the
present value (V ) of expected utility of starting
out as a sharecropper is given by 
U(y, L) + (1 – p(L)) V + p(L)Z
V = –––––––––––––––––––––––  (2)
1 + r
where income and disutility of effort are both
evaluated at the end of the period. 
Z is the tenant’s fallback position, i.e. the
tenant’s best available utility from alternative
activities.
7 As Hayami and Kawagoe (1993)
note; “In the village community everyone is
watching everyone. Gossip about one’s mis-
conduct is circulated by word of mouth faster
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6. Models of this type are analyzed in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and Bowles and Gintis (1990), both studying
the employer-employee relationship. An alternative formulation of the problem is to assume that the landlord
decides the share as well as the tenant’s labor input. But a tenant’s labor input is not easy to verify in a complex
and uncertain agricultural environment, and hence cannot be determined by contractual agreement. Instead
the landlord has to rely on an imperfect measure of the tenant’s work intensity. Field studies from rural
Bangladesh also support the view that labor input is controlled by the tenants: “[L]andlords stipulate neither the
cropping pattern nor the inputs to be supplied by the tenant. The tenant are apparently quite free to rent land from
several landlords and cultivate it as they wish.” (Taslim, 1989 p. 246). This observation is also supported by Singh
(1988).
7. For simplicity we assume that income and disutility of effort are both evaluated at the end of the period.
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(p.167). In such an environment, tenants who
have been evicted for poor performance will
soon become known and landlords will not
hire them as sharecroppers. The alternative
activity for both the landed and the landless
tenant is thus casual labor employment. Z can
then be interpreted as the lifetime utility of a
tenant when he becomes a casual laborer.
8
Equation (2) then says that the tenant receives
U during this period plus the present value V
if not evicted, that occurs with probability 
(1 – p(L)), plus the present value if evicted,
that occurs with probability p(L). 
The tenant chooses labor input L  to
maximize the present value of expected utility,
given in (2). Solving for in (2) gives
αf (L) – cL + p(L)Z
V =  –––––––––––––––––  (3)
r + p(L)
Maximizing (3) with respect to L gives the
following first order condition for the tenant 
αf ′(L) – (V – Z )p′(L) = c          (4)
The first term of (5) shows the tenant’s direct
gain from higher income when labor input
on the sharecropped land is increased (his
share of the marginal product of labor), while
the second term shows the expected indirect
gain arising from increased labor input. p′(L)
indicates the decrease in the probability of
eviction by increasing labor input, and (V– Z)
is the value of holding a sharecropping
contract (the difference between the value of
utility from being a sharecropper and the value
of utility from being a casual laborer). The
quantity (V – Z ) can thus be interpreted as
the cost of losing tenancy, a cost which the
tenant seeks to avoid through hard work.
9
Accordingly, equation (3) says that, for any
given share, the tenant will determine how
hard to work on the sharecropped land by
trading-off the direct gain from increased
labor input plus the effect that additional
effort has on the probability of retaining the
contract, against the marginal disutility of
effort. 
Equation (3) defines the tenant’s reaction
function L(α), which shows the level of effort
by the tenant for any given share. This effort
response function is increasing in α as figure
1 shows.
10 The landlord determines the value
of the share α as to maximize his own income
π = (1 – α)f (L), knowing that a higher share
for the tenant induce him to put in more
effort. Hence, when making an offer to the
tenant the landlord has to balance two effects
working in opposite directions. An increase
in the share will enhance the tenant’s effort,
raising output on the sharecropped land and
thus the landlord’s income. But at the same
time an increase in the share also reduces the
landlord’s income. As long as the indirect gains
from an increased share exceed the direct loss
ion income of the increase, a higher share will
be offered and the cost of loosing tenancy will
be positive. 
The resulting equilibrium pair (α1,L1) is
illustrated in figure 1. The iso-income curve
126 Jon Reiersen
8. Recall that the typical landed tenant has too little land to secure an income over the subsistence minimum. He
is therefore dependent on alternative activities to employ his excess labor power.
9. Clearly, the landlord’s threat of eviction is credible only if V > Z. If V = Z, the tenant is indifferent between
being a sharecropper and alternative employment opportunities and it makes no sense for the landlord to super-
vise the tenant’s labor input. The tenant would not care about the supervision, since he is in a position to shift
to other activities at no cost.
10. Assume that the second order condition for a local maximum is fulfilled. Differentiating (5) totally with respect
to α and solve for dL/dα verifies that L is increasing in α.
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2 represents share/effort combinations
yielding the same income for the landlord.





Both the landed and landless tenant will
choose labor input so as to satisfy the first
order condition, given by (3). Graphically this
means that they will choose an effort level
along their reaction function L(α). However,
the structure of social relations in which the
landed tenant is embedded enhances his work
incentives compared to the landless tenant. If
evicted, the landed tenant may be forced to
enter the casual labor market, which means
being socially derogated. In contrast, the
landless tenant has no social status to defend.
If evicted, he loses the contract rent, but has
no objection taking up waged employment as
an alternative to sharecropping. The quest for
social status will, in other words, increase the
desirability of retaining the contract for the
landed tenant. If the landed tenant can secure
a renewal of the lease, he can make a fuller
utilization of his otherwise unemployable
labor power. If the lease is terminated, part of
his labor power will remain under-utilized,
alternatively he may be forced to enter the
casual labor market and be socially derogated.
The stream of utility for the landed tenant in
alternative activities is thus lower compared
to the landless tenant. This can be modeled as
a reduction in Z for the landed tenant, raising
the cost of losing tenancy. When the cost of
losing tenancy increase, the tenant will work
harder in order to keep the contract (for a
given share), i.e. the tenant’s reaction function
shifts to the right. This makes the land-owning
tenant more profitable to hire. Increased
income for the landlord follows directly from
the fact that he gets more effort from the
tenant for each share offer. 
Figure 1 shows the effect of a decrease in
Z. The new equilibrium pair (α2,L2) is
illustrated by the tangency point between the
iso-income curve π
1 of the landlord and the
new effort response curve, leading to a
reduction in the tenant’s share and an
increased effort. Clearly this is in the interest
of the landlord. Hence, the landlord will get a
higher return if he leases out the land to a
landed rather than a landless tenant. 
Concluding remarks
Social concerns and influences, which include
social status as an important component, are
important in shaping human action. Yet, it is
only recently that economists have tried to
incorporate such considerations explicitly. As
Fershtman and Weiss (1998) document, these
attempts have for the most followed the
strategy of simply recognizing the role of social
rewards followed by an examination of
economic implications. This is also the
strategy followed in this paper. A more
ambitious program is to explain how
preferences for status arise, and how such
preferences change over time. It is far beyond
the scope of this paper to explore this question
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Figure 1.
Equilibrium share and effort levels for the
landlord and the effect of a reduction in the
tenant’s fallback position.
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however, that Jansen (1986) finds that, due to
the extreme poverty in rural Bangladesh and
the insecure situation many people find
themselves in, the gap between ideal and
actual behavior seems to increase in many
situations. When a choice has to be made
between exploiting an economic opportunity
and behaving properly, more and more seem
to opt for the former. The great majority
simply cannot afford to practice and live
according to established social norms if this
means sacrificing material rewards. As a
consequence, many seem to have developed
subtle double moral standards, or as one man
puts it: “If I acted like I talk and preach, my
children would starve. (…) Poverty forces us to
be ruthless. If we are not clever and cunning we
have no chance of eating rice every day and we
will leave our children without land.” (Jansen,
1986 p. 71). This observation indicates that
in the long run, and as long as Bangladesh
stays poor, social norms loose its “grip on the
mind” among the rural population in
Bangladesh. The struggle for survival will
dominate people’s behavior. In the contexts of
this paper the consequence may be that a poor
smallholder will opt for wage employment
and loss of status, if this increases his chances
of “eating rice every day”. He will not hang
on to sharecropping if this means a loss in
income. 
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